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ARBITRARY CIVIL RIGHTS?: THE CASE OF
D UFFIELD V. ROBERTSON STEPHENS
"From fearful trip the victor ship comes in with object won"
Walt Whitman, 0 Captain! My Captain!
I. INTRODUCTION
In May 1998, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals handed down
its decision in Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Company,' and in so
doing, opened another chapter in the heated debate surrounding
compulsory arbitration of employment disputes. In Duffield, a three-
judge panel announced that, notwithstanding a pre-dispute compul-
sory arbitration agreement, an employee may not be forced to arbi-
trate her Title VII2 statutory claims.3
To fully understand the implications of the ruling in Duffield,
one must have an appreciation of the scope of employment litigation.
The dramatic increase in employment litigation began in the early
1990s. The Civil Rights Act of 1991, 4 the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act,5 and the Americans with Disabilities Act6 gave
employees the ability to sue their employers in federal court for har-
assment or discrimination on a variety of grounds.
7
Consequently, embattled employees took advantage of these
new rights. The result has taken an alarming toll on federal courts.
Employment litigation has increased by 400% over the last twenty
1. 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 445 (1998).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-e(17) (1994).
3. See Dufield, 144 F.3d at 1185.
4. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as a historical and statu-
tory note to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994)).
5. Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967).
6. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990).
7. See Paul Eisenberg, Got A Beef? Take it Out of Court, BUS.
PHILADELPHIA, Sept. 1, 1996, at 31.
8. See id.; Kevin McKenzie, Crush of Complaints Straining EEOC,
ROCKY MTN. NEws, Oct. 16, 1996, at 30A.
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years.9 The number of employment related civil rights lawsuits filed
in federal court rose 128% from 1991 to 1995.10 For example, em-
ployment discrimination lawsuits alone composed roughly ten per-
cent of the federal docket in 1996.11 Furthermore, it takes approxi-
mately two and a half years from the filing of a discrimination suit to
the commencement of the trial.
12
Economically, the cost to an employer to defend a discrimina-
tion lawsuit can be staggering. 13 For example, the legal fees alone to
defend a Title VII discrimination lawsuit can reach $200,000.14
Further, heavy punitive damage awards compound the costs to em-
ployers. In 1995, the typical jury award in sexual discrimination
lawsuits was $927,269 with verdicts for the plaintiff in 42% of the
cases. 15 Plainly, the cost of employment litigation is staggering.
These statistics illustrate both the economic impact of protracted
employment litigation on employer resources and the increased bur-
den on the courts. 16 The result has been a shift toward alternate dis-
pute resolution (ADR) and away from a traditional judicial forum.
17
In contrast to the staggering figures involved in employment litiga-
tion, the cost to defend a Title VII discrimination suit through an ar-
bitration mechanism is often less than $20,000.18 Moreover, the
ADR process arrives at a faster resolution than judicial litigation.
19
For example, from 1990 to 1995, companies using ADR saved more
than $2,000,000 over companies who chose litigation.20 Moreover,
refuge fr6m anti-employer sentiment of the lay jury increases ADR's
9. See Richard D. Wilkins, Arbitrate or Out!, CENT. N.Y. Bus. J., Feb. 5,
1996, at 1.
10. See McKenzie, supra note 8, at 30A.
11. See Wilkins, supra note 9, at 1.
12. See id.
13. See Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 31.
14. See id.
15. See Litigation: Average Punitive Award Down in 1995 According to
California Verdicts Study, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 97, at D-13 (May 20,
1996).
16. See Stuart H. Bompey et al., The Attack on Arbitration and Mediation
of Employment Disputes, 13 LAB. LAW. 21, 22-23 (1997).
17. See Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 31.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See id.
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attractiveness to employers. 21 Thus, arbitration is an "advantageous
vehicle" for employers who wish to avoid the cost, inconvenience,
and uncertainty of civil litigation.22
In light of the federal civil rights statutes providing employees
with direct judicial recourse, employers needed a mechanism to ac-
cess ADR and, in particular, arbitration. The most effective method
to ensure arbitration of employment disputes is to include compul-
sory arbitration clauses in employment contracts.23 The result of
these "binding arbitration" clauses is a method and process whereby
employers gain access to ADR without fear of the cost, delay, and
prejudice of federal court discrimination litigation. Employers gain
consent, often tacit, of their employees to arbitrate any future dis-
putes. The binding arbitration clause does not always protect both
parties.
The nature of these arbitration agreements is the focus of much
dispute between employers on the one side and civil rights activists
and employees on the other. Despite the advantages of ADR, many
employees are prospectively rejecting ADR on grounds that it does
not adequately protect their rights and are seeking a way to return
their claims to federal judicial forum.24 Consequently, employees
are challenging and seeking to avoid these binding arbitration
clauses.
Often the scope of these arbitration agreements is the focal point
of such challenges and a careful definition of compulsory is illustra-
tive. The Duffield court described these agreements as compulsory
"when individuals must sign an agreement waiving their rights to
litigate future claims in a judicial forum in order to obtain employ-
ment with, or continue to work for, the employer." 25 In contrast,
compulsory arbitration agreements do not include "systems under
which employees agree, or otherwise elect, after disputes have arisen
21. See Rachel H. Yarkon, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Lawyers: Ne-
gotiated Settlement of Gender Discrimination Claims Arising from Termina-
tion of Employment, 2 HARV. NEGOTIATION L. REV. 165, 174-75 & n.50
(1997).
22. Bompey, supra note 16, at 23.
23. See Nancy L. Abell et al., Selected Tips for Defending Employment
Cases, in CA35 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 1015, 1035-37 (1996).
24. See, e.g., Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1187.
25. Id.
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to submit them to arbitration." 26 It is the former arbitration agree-
ment definition that has been the subject of protracted litigation, vo-
luminous opinions, and legal commentary. The Duffield decision
departs from ambiguous precedent and turns a new page in employ-
ment dispute resolution.
Part H of this Note analyzes the historical backdrop of the en-
forceability of the mandatory arbitration clause in employment
agreements. This section examines the Federal Arbitration Act of
1925,27 subsequent judicial interpretations, and statutory authority,
primarily centering on the Civil Rights and Women's Equity in Em-
ployment Act of 1991 (the "Civil Rights Act of 1991" or "CRA).
28
It traces the development of mandatory arbitration jurisprudence and
outlines the litigation framework. Part III analyzes the Ninth Cir-
cuit's decision and reasoning in Duffield, focusing on Duffield's legal
analysis within this precedential framework. Part IV investigates and
criticizes the weak aspects of the opinion. Finally, Part V argues and
concludes that the case law, statutory authority, and public policy
support the outcome despite the flaws in Duffield's reasoning.
II. THE ENFORCEABILITY OF MANDATORY ARBITRATION CLAUSES
The Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 (FAA),29 provides for the
enforcement of general arbitration agreements. Enacted to give ar-
bitration agreements federal contractual rights protection, the Act
serves as a backdrop to any arbitration discussion and must be under-
stood before a careful examination of the legal precedents. This sec-
tion analyzes the FAA and then details the relevant case law inter-
pretations.
In 1974, the Court agreed to address the issue of enforcement of
compulsory arbitration clauses in the employment context for the
first time. In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,30 the Supreme
Court declined to compel arbitration of the employee's Title VII
claim, despite a compulsory arbitration provision in the governing
26. Id.
27. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
28. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified
as a historical and statutory note to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994)).
29. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
30. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
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collective bargaining agreement.31 Subsequently, in the mid-1980s,
the Court decided a trilogy of cases which reversed the Gardner-
Denver presumption against the enforcement of arbitration clauses
with regard to statutory claims.32 Then, in 1991, the Supreme Court
decided the seminal case Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,
33
and held that, pursuant to an arbitration clause contained in the secu-
rities registration application, an employee was required to arbitrate
his age discrimination claim.34
Coincident with the decision in Gilmer, Congress passed the
Civil Rights Act of 1991.35 This Act was designed to increase the
remedies available under Title VII and to facilitate the initiation of
discrimination suits "to deter unlawful harassment and intentional
discrimination" in the employment arena.36 In addition, it contained
an ambiguous phrase endorsing alternative dispute resolution
"[w]here appropriate and to the extent authorized by law."
37
A. The Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 Background
In 1925, Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act to place
agreements to arbitrate on par with other contractual agreements.
38
Subsequently, the scope of the FAA was determined to be cotermi-
nous with the reach of congressional commerce power.39 Thus, for
31. See id. at 47-49, 59-60.
32. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S.
477, 481 (1989); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220,
241-42 (1987); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614, 640 (1985).
33. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
34. See id. at 35.
35. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 118, 105 Stat. 1071, 1081 (codified as a histori-
cal and statutory note to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994)).
36. Id. § 2, 105 Stat. at 1071.
37. Id. § 118, 105 Stat. at 1081.
38. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24. The FAA specifically states that "[a] writ-
ten provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out
of such contract or transaction... shall be valid, irrevocable and enforceable..
." 9 U.S.C § 2 (1994).
39. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 273 (1995)
(holding the FAA preempts Alabama law invalidating pre-dispute arbitration
agreement); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (empowering Congress to
regulate interstate commerce).
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an arbitration agreement in an employment contract to be within the
FAA's presumption of validity, an employer must demonstrate that
the business somehow involves interstate commerce. 40 The Supreme
Court, however, has interpreted this requirement with such broad
construction so as to virtually eliminate it.41 Thus, the FAA extends
federal statutory protection and endorsement to most, if not all, arbi-
tration covenants.
Despite the seemingly broad scope of this coverage, section 1 of
the FAA incorporates several apparent exclusions.42 Section 1 states
that "nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employ-
ment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 43 At first blush, section
1 seems to exclude all employment contracts from FAA enforce-
ment. After further inspection, the language of section 1 evinces a
congressional intent to exempt interstate transportation employee
agreements from FAA coverage. Consequently, the issue of whether
the FAA endorses arbitration clauses in labor and employment con-
tracts has been largely left to the judiciary.
Not surprisingly, the circuits have split with regard to the con-
struction of section 1. A narrow approach, adopted by the Fourth
Circuit, excludes all employment contracts from FAA coverage.
44
Conversely, a broad construction interpretation, favored by the First,
Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and D.C. Circuits, holds
that employment agreement arbitration clauses fall under the penum-
bra of the FAA, provided the agreement does not involve the
40. See Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 273. "Involving commerce" requires that
the employer demonstrates that the employer's activities affect interstate com-
merce, the employee produces goods for interstate commerce, or the employee
works in interstate commerce. See id.; see also Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483
(1987) (holding that the FAA preempts California law precluding compulsory
arbitration of wage collection claims).
41. See Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 273; cf Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 11
(1942) (holding that a farmer producing wheat entirely within Ohio indirectly
affected interstate commerce and, thus, was subject to the reach of the Com-
merce Clause).
42. See 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
43. Id.
44. See United Elec., Radio, & Mach. Workers v. Miller Metal Prods., 215
F.2d 221,224 (4th Cir. 1954).
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transportation industry. 45 - The Ninth Circuit has yet to directly con-
sider the scope of section 1.
Although the Ninth Circuit has not decided the scope of the
FAA as applied to individual employment contracts and does not di-
rectly discuss the issue in Duffield, the legacy of the FAA generates
underlying federal policy considerations. These considerations
sparked the development of a strong federal policy in favor of arbi-
tration and run throughout this discussion.46 Despite the FAA's pro-
arbitration mandate, the first step taken by the Supreme Court is
backward-away from the enforcement of arbitration agreements.
B. The Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. First Step
In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,47 the Supreme Court held
that a discharged union member could bring a Title VII suit in fed-
eral court despite the fact that the discharge had previously been ar-
bitrated pursuant to grievance procedures in the union's collective
bargaining agreement. 48 In Gardner-Denver, the defendant company
discharged Harrell Alexander, a black drill operator.49 He subse-
quently lodged a complaint with the Steelworker's Union alleging
racial discrimination under the collective bargaining agreement's
contractual nondiscrimination clause.50 A compulsory arbitration
provision in the collective bargaining agreement subjected Alexan-
der's claim to binding arbitration.
51
Prior to the arbitration, however, Alexander filed a discrimina-
tion complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
45. See Penny v. United Parcel Serv., 128 F.3d 408, 412 (6th Cir. 1997);
Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832, 835 (8th Cir. 1997); Great
Western Mortgage Corp. v. Peacock, 110 F.3d 222, 227 (3d Cir. 1997); Pryner
v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 357 (7th Cir. 1997); Cole v. Bums Int'l.
Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1472 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Rojas v. TK Communica-
tions, Inc., 87 F.3d 745, 748 (5th Cir. 1996); Erving v. Virginia Squires Bas-
ketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064, 1069 (2d Cir. 1972); Dickstein v. duPont, 443
F.2d 783, 785 (1st Cir. 1971).
46. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24-25.
47. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
48. See id. at 59-60.
49. See id. at 38.
50. See id. at 42.
51. See id. at 40-42.
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(EEOC).5 2 The arbitrator ruled that Alexander was discharged for
just cause and the EEOC dismissed his claim. Alexander then
brought a Title VII racial discrimination action in federal court.
54
The Gardner-Denver Company contended that the collective bar-
gaining agreement's arbitration procedure provided Alexander with
an adequate remedy and moved to dismiss the suit.55 The district
court granted Gardner-Denver's motion and the appeals court af-
firmed. 56
On review, the Supreme Court held that the collective bargain-
ing agreement's arbitration provision did not foreclose Alexander's
statutory right to trial under Title VIIi" The Court first analyzed Ti-
tle VII's enforcement scheme and concluded "Congress indicated
that it considered the policy against discrimination to be of the 'high-
est priority' [and] [c]onsistent with this view, Title VII provides for
consideration of employment-discrimination claims in several fo-
rums." 58 Within these several forums, the Gardner-Denver Court
regarded the federal courts as the final enforcement authority stating:
"The purpose and procedures of Title VII indicate that Congress in-
tended federal courts to exercise final responsibility for enforcement
of Title VII; deferral to arbitral decisions would be inconsistent with
that goal.",59 The Court further stated that "Title VII's purpose and
procedures strongly suggest that an individual does not forfeit his
private cause of action if he first pursues his grievance to final arbi-
tration."
60
Although Gardner-Denver was decided within the labor-
collective bargaining agreement-arbitration context, the sweeping
language of the Court indicated a wider intended application. For
many years, the "decision was cited for the rule that no agreement to
52. See id. at 42.
53. See id.
54. See id. at 43.
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See id. at 47.
58. Id. (quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402
(1968)).
59. Id. at 56.
60. Id. at 49.
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arbitrate could prevent a civil rights plaintiff from bringing suit in
federal court."
61
Seven years later, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Gardner-
Denver decision. In Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System,
Inc.,62 the Court held that an employee's Fair Labor Standards Act
claim could be raised in federal court despite a compulsory arbitra-
tion grievance procedure in the governing collective bargaining
agreement.63 Allowing the employee's claim to be raised in a judi-
cial forum, the Court noted that the statutory rights at issue were "de-
signed to provide minimum substantive guarantees to individual
workers."6 Despite the Gardner-Denver and Barrentine decisions,
the Supreme Court, in 1985, reversed the presumption against arbi-
trability of statutory claims.
C. The Mitsubishi Shift
In a series of three cases decided in the mid-1980s, the Supreme
Court reversed the long-standing presumption spawned in Gardner-
Denver and held that statutory claims could be the subject of an ar-
bitration agreement.65 Notably, the Court managed to preserve the
precedential value of Gardner-Denver even while shifting away from
its ideology and holding.
In the first of these cases, Mitsubishi Motors Corporation,66 the
Court compelled the arbitration of antitrust claims brought under the
Sherman Act.67 Grounding its decision in contract principles, the
Court held that if a party makes a contract to arbitrate, "the party
should be held to it unless Congress... has evinced an intention to
preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at
61. Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 995 F. Supp.
190, 194 (D. Mass. 1998) (emphasis added).
62. 450 U.S. 728 (1981).
63. See id. at 745; see also McDonald v. City of W. Branch, 466 U.S. 284,
292 (1984) (stating that awards received pursuant to collective bargaining
agreement arbitration procedures should not be accorded res judicata effect).
64. See Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 737.
65. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S.
477, 486 (1989); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220,
242 (1987); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614, 640 (1985).
66. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 614.
67. See id. at 640.
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issue. '' 8 The Court subsequently enforced an arbitration agreement
brought pursuant to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions Act ("RICO"). 69 Finally, in Rodriguez de Quias,7° the Court
held statutory securities claims brought pursuant to the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 to be arbitrable under the FAA.7'
As a consequence of the Mitsubishi trilogy, the FAA was pre-
sumed to apply to all agreements to arbitrate unless one of three con-
ditions was found. For an arbitration agreement to be set aside, the
plaintiff must show (1) "Congress had expressed an intent to pre-
clude compulsory arbitration, either in the statute's text or its legis-
lative history; (2) that there was an inherent conflict between com-
pulsory arbitration and the statute's purpose; or (3) the arbitral forum
was inadequate to vindicate the plaintiff's rights effectively. 72
Thus, all future statutory claims subject to compulsory arbitration
clauses will be analyzed under this framework. The clause will be
presumed valid and enforceable unless one of the three amorphic
categories indicate a reason to set it aside.
73
Although none of the Mitsubishi trilogy directly involved Title
VII claims, the implication was that the rule against compulsory ar-
bitration of statutory claims was gone and with it, the judicial forum
guarantees of Gardner-Denver. Indeed, with these cases, the Court
announced and reaffirmed a "healthy regard for the federal policy" in
favor of arbitration stemming from the FAA enacted sixty years ear-
lier.74 However, because the Mitsubishi trilogy focused exclusively
on "arbitration agreements in the setting of business transactions,"
the application of these precedents to Title VII claims remained un-
clear.75 Based on the civil rights subject matter of Gardner-Denver,
several courts envisioned a different outcome if a Mitsubishi-style
analysis was applied to civil rights statutes. Gilmer, of course, had
not yet been decided.
68. Id. at 628.
69. See McMahon, 482 U.S. at 242.
70. Rodriguez de Quias, 490 U.S. at 477.
71. See id. at 486.
72. Rosenburg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 995 F. Supp.
190, 195-96 (D. Mass. 1998).
73. See id.
74. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 626.
75. Rodriguez, 490 U.S. at 484 (emphasis added).
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D. The Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Rule
Although the Mitsubishi cases were read broadly as applying
contract law principles to enforce arbitration agreements solely in the
business transactional context, in 1991, the Supreme Court extended
the enforcement of arbitration provisions into the civil rights arena.
76
In Gilmer, the Court declared for the first time that an employee
could be compelled to arbitrate a discrimination claim pursuant to an
individual employment contract. 77  The plaintiff, Robert Gilmer,
worked as a manager of financial services with the defendant com-
pany.78 As a condition of his employment, Gilmer was required to
register as a securities broker with the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE).79 The registration application, commonly known as Form
U-4, contained, inter alia, a provision wherein Gilmer "'agree[d] to
arbitrate any dispute, claim or controversy' arising between him and
Interstate" pursuant to the governing provisions of the NYSE.8 ° In
particular, the NYSE rules stated that arbitration would be required
in "[a]ny controversy between a registered representative and any
member or member organization arising out of the employment or
termination of employment."'
In 1987, when Gilmer reached the age of sixty-two, Interstate
terminated his employment. -82 Believing age was relevant to his dis-
charge, Gilmer filed a charge with the EEOC and then subsequently
brought suit in federal court alleging a violation of the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA).83 Interstate re-
sponded by moving to compel arbitration of the claim pursuant to the
Form U-4 and claimed that the FAA required enforcement of the
mandatory arbitration clause.84  The district court, 'following the
Gardner-Denver mandate, denied Interstate/Johnson's motion to
76. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991).
77. See id. at 35.
78. See id. at 23.
79. See id.
80. Id.
81. Id. (emphasis added).
82. See id.
83. See id. at 23-24; see also Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (West 1998) (providing for a federal cause of action for age
discrimination).
84. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24.
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compel. 85 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed,
noting that "nothing in the text, legislative history, or... purposes of
the ADEA indicat[ed] a congressional intent to preclude enforcement
of arbitration agreements."
8
On review, the Supreme Court subjected the ADEA to a Mitsu-
bishi-type analysis, stating "[i]t is by now clear that statutory claims
may be the subject of an arbitration agreement, enforceable pursuant
to the FAA."87 The Court reasoned that if Congress intended to pre-
clude arbitration from the ADEA, it would "be discoverable in the
text.., legislative history, or an 'inherent conflict' between arbitra-
tion and the ADEA's underlying purposes."8 8 Upon careful exami-
nation of the ADEA, the Court concluded that neither its text nor
legislative history explicitly precluded arbitration.8 9 Despite this
language, the Court managed to preserve the Gardner-Denver deci-
sion.
The Gilmer Court distinguished Gardner-Denver on three
grounds without overruling it. First, the Court reasoned that the
Gardner-Denver holding was limited to statutory claims brought in
connection with a collective bargaining agreement. Second, unlike
Harrell Alexander who was subject to a collective bargaining agree-
ment negotiated by a third party union, Robert Gilmer independently
signed the Form U-4 and agreed to submit any disputes to arbitra-
tion.90 Third, the Court reasoned that the Mitsubishi cases, decided
pursuant to the FAA, "reflect[ed] a 'liberal federal policy favoring
arbitration agreements"' while the Gardner-Denver decision did not
implicate the FAA.91 Concluding that Mitsubishi controlled Gil-
mer's claim and consequently fell under the FAA, the Supreme
Court held that Gardner-Denver did not control in FAA-covered
claims. 92  Thus, Gilmer established new precedent by extending
85. See id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 26.
88. Id. (quoting Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S.
220, 227 (1987)).
89. See id.
90. See id. at 23, 35.
91. Id. at 35.
92. See id. at 33-35.
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Mitsubishi to the ADEA and established a framework for analyzing
statutory claims subject to compulsory arbitration.
E. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 Wrinkle
In the same year that the Supreme Court handed down the deci-
sion in Gilmer, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991. 93
The CRA was designed to amend Title VII and to reinforce the civil
rights of employees subject to job discrimination.94 In addition, the
Act contained a specific section dealing with the arbitrability of em-
ployment discrimination claims. 95 Because the CRA was drafted be-
fore, but enacted after Gilmer, the extent to which the CRA amend-
ments-directed primarily at the scope of the rights of victims of
employment discrimination-impact the existing law as interpreted
by the Supreme Court in Gilmer and Gardner-Denver is unclear.
The interpretation of the effect of the CRA is the pivotal issue in
Duffield. To begin, an examination of the underlying purpose and
legislative history behind the CRA amendments is instrumental to
understanding on which side of the arbitral line the CRA falls.
The CRA had two primary goals to augment existing remedies
available under Title VII. It was designed to combat increased har-
assment and discrimination in the workplace and to provide statutory
substantive and procedural guidelines to facilitate the adjudication of
suits brought pursuant to Title VII.96 Moreover, section 3 announced
an additional goal: "to respond to recent decisions of the Supreme
Court by expanding the scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order
to provide adequate protection to victims of discrimination."97 Con-
gress intended the CRA to respond to a series of 1989 Supreme
Court decisions that Congress considered to be too restrictive an in-
terpretation of Title VII.98 The CRA was designed to codify a spe-
cific rule of construction for future courts: all civil rights laws were
to be given a broad interpretation to effectuate their remedial
93. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071 (1991).
94. See id. § 3, 105 Stat. at 1071.
95. See id. § 118, 105 Sta. at 1081.
96. See id. § 3, 105 Stat. at 1071.
97. Id. (emphasis added).
98. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40(I), at 88 (1991), reprinted in 1991
U.S.S.C.A.N. 549, 627.
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purposes.9 9 In codifying this rule of construction, Congress intended
that when the statutory terms in civil rights laws were "susceptible to
several alternative interpretations, the courts... [were] to select the
construction which most effectively advances the underlying con-
gressional purpose."'10 0 Thus, Congress attempted to rein in the Su-
preme Court's conservative interpretations of Title VII. Congress,
however, had failed to announce in what shape these interpretations
should crystallize-Gardner-Denver or Gilmer.
In addition to section 3, the CRA includes a provision address-
ing alternative dispute resolution which further clouds its construc-
tion. Section 118 of the CRA encourages alternative dispute resolu-
tion "[w]here appropriate and to the extent authorized by law...
,,101 Because the language of section 118 was drafted prior to the
Gilmer decision but enacted after Gilmer was decided, the question
becomes whether Congress was referring to the Gardner-Denver de-
cision as appropriate and authorized by law-thus indicating a bar on
pre-dispute arbitration agreements consistent with that opinion-or
whether Congress intended to encourage such agreements, consistent
with the opinion in Gilmer. The revelation to this question presuma-
bly can be found in the legislative history-the exact intent of Con-
gress. The resolution is unclear despite the voluminous written his-
tory underlying the CRA, however, several intimations can be drawn
from a study of the congressional debate surrounding the CRA's pas-
sage.
House Report No. 102-40(11) seems to resolve the question in
favor of Gardner-Denver.10 2 The report, drafted before Gilmer,
plainly states that "any agreement to submit disputed issues to arbi-
tration, whether in the context of a collective bargaining agreement
99. See, e.g., Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 443 (1991).
100. H.R. REP. No. 102-40(I), at 88.
101. Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 118, 105 Stat. at 1081. The full text of sec-
tion 118 reads:
Where appropriate and to the extent authorized by law, the use of al-
ternative means of dispute resolution, including settlement negotia-
tions, conciliation, facilitation, mediation, factfinding, minitrials, and
arbitration, is encouraged to resolve disputes arising under the Acts or
provisions of Federal law amended by this title.
Id. (emphasis added).
102. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40(I), at 97.
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or in an employment contract, does not preclude the affected person
from seeking relief under the enforcement provisions of Title V'' °3
Congress declared, "[t]his view is consistent with the Supreme
Court's interpretation of Title VII in [Gardner-Denver]."'1 4 Clearly,
Congress intended Gardner-Denver to control not only in disputes
governed by collective bargaining agreements, but also in the context
of single employment contracts. Under the rubric of the Mitsubishi
framework, the legislative history underlying statutory claims pursu-
ant to the CRA indicated an intent to preclude compulsory arbitration
of Title VII claims.10 5 Thus, the endorsement of alternative dispute
resolution under section 118 seems subject to the constraints of
Gardner-Denver and is designed to "supplement, not supplant, the
remedies provided by Title VII."
106
Ironically, the textual references adopting the Gardner-Denver
precedent, subjected section 118 to another, broader, view on the
proper use of arbitration. A second interpretation of section 118 fo-
cuses on the intent of Congress to favor arbitration where the parties
knowingly and voluntarily elect to use those methods. Section 118 is
susceptible to the interpretation that arbitration is favored when an
employee voluntarily agrees to the clause, regardless of whether it is
a condition of employment. This proposition drove the decision in
Gilmer and finds support in, of all places, Gardner-Denver.
10 7
The Gardner-Denver Court recognized that a voluntary agree-
ment to waive an employee's cause of action under Title VII may be
valid: "In determining the effectiveness of any such waiver, a court
would have to determine... that the employee's consent to the set-
tlement was voluntary and knowing.' 1°8 Thus, although buried in a
103. Id. (emphasis added).
104. Id.
105. See Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227
(1987); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 628 (1985).
106. H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(I), at 97.
107. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 52 (1974) (stating
that "presumably an employee may waive his cause of action under Title VII
as part of a voluntary settlement"). Because the dispute arose pursuant to a
collectively bargained employment agreement, the Court did not consider the
waiver argument. See id.
108. Id. at 52 & n.15. The Ninth Circuit has adopted a knowing and volun-
tary waiver requirement. See Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299,
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footnote, the Gardner-Denver Court acknowledged that an employee
could waive her statutory right through a "voluntary and knowing
waiver"-a point later relied upon in Gilmer. 1
09
Consequently, the legislative history of section 118's ambiguous
endorsement of arbitration in Title VII claims could be interpreted as
an endorsement of voluntary arbitration of statutory claims (Gilmer)
or a preclusion of employment contract arbitration clause of civil
rights (Gardner-Denver). From the CRA, its legislative history, and
the prior and subsequent Supreme Court decisions, it is clear that any
attempt to enforce a compulsory arbitration agreement with respect
to an individual employment contract must square its reasoning with
both Gardner-Denver and Gilmer in light of the CRA. In 1998, for
the first time, the Ninth Circuit attempted just such a feat.
III. THE DUFFIELD v ROBERTSONSTEPHENS & CO. OPINION
In 1988, Tonja Duffield began working as a securities broker-
dealer for Robertson Stephens & Company." 0 Prior to the start of
her employment, Duffield, like the plaintiff in Gilmer, was required
to "waive her right to a judicial forum to resolve all 'employment
related' disputes and to agree instead to arbitrate any such dis-
putes.""' She waived these rights by executing, as a condition of her
employment, the industry's securities registration Form U-4.12 Be-
cause Robertson Stephens was a member of the NYSE and the Na-
tional Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), the company was
listed on the Form U-4 as Duffield's employer." 3 Both the NYSE
1304-05 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 812 (1995). A discussion of
the rigors of a Title VII waiver, however, is beyond the scope of this comment.
For a more in-depth discussion, see Christine K. Biretta, Prudential Insurance
Company of America v. Lai: The Beginning of the End for Mandatory Arbi-
tration?, 49 RUTGERS L. REv. 595 (1997).
109. The Gilmer Court relied upon legislative history discussing the non-
judicial resolution of the ADEA. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Co.,
500 U.S. 20, 29 (1991). The legislative history of the ADEA parallels the arbi-
tration language of the CRA. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40(11), at 41.
110. See Duffield v. Robertson Stephens Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1186 (1998).
111. Id. at 1185.
112. See id. at 1186.
113. See id. at 1185.
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and the NASD had rules in place to "compel employees to arbitrate
any employment-related dispute at the request of their employers."
' 4
In January 1995, Duffield brought suit against Robertson Ste-
phens alleging sexual discrimination and harassment in violation of
Title VII." In addition, she brought claims for breach of contract,
deceit, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent in-
fliction of emotional distress. 1 6  As a threshold matter, Duffield
sought a declaratory judgment stating that securities employees can-
not be compelled to arbitrate their claims pursuant to the arbitration
clause in the Form U-4.11 7 Duffield argued, inter alia, that the CRA
precluded the enforcement of the arbitration clause with respect to
her Title VII claims. 1 8 Relying on the text and legislative history of
the CRA, Duffield argued that Congress expressly intended to distin-
guish between two types of statutory claims. 119 She argued that the
CRA demarcated a line between "post-1991 Title VII claims (like
hers) from the pre-1990 ADEA claim that the Supreme Court found
arbitrable in Gilmer."'
120
Robertson Stephens subsequently moved to compel arbitration
pursuant to the Form U-4 clause. 121 The district court denied Duf-
field's request for declaratory judgment and granted Robertson
114. Id. at 1186. Since the disposition of Duffield v. Robertson Stephens &
Co., the NASD has eliminated its mandatory arbitration of civil rights claims
provision. See NASD Proposes Eliminating Mandatory Arbitration of Em-
ployment Discrimination Claims for Registered Brokers, NASD Press Release
(visited Jan 12, 1999) <http://www.nasdaqnews.com/news/pr/nesection9752.
html>. The replacement provision, which would allow the employee broker to
reserve the right to a judicial forum, has yet to be approved by the Securities
and Exchange Commission. See id.
115. See Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1186.
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. See id. Duffield also advanced four additional arguments which are not
discussed herein. In addition to the CRA argument, she asserted: 1) that the
Form U-4 was not a knowing agreement to arbitrate; 2) that the NYSE arbitra-
tion rules fail to adequately protect Title VII rights; 3) that the Form U-4 was
an unconscionable adhesion contract; and 4) that the mandatory arbitration
agreement was an unconstitutional condition of employment. See id.
119. See id. at 1189-90.
120. Id. at 1190.
121. See id. at 1186.
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Stephens's motion to compel arbitration. 122 The court, however, re-
fused to enter final judgment on the declaratory judgment claim, and
certified its order for immediate appeal. 123 Duffield then appealed
the order to the Ninth Circuit.
While Duffield predicated her arguments on the CRA's en-
dorsement of a judicial forum, Robertson Stephens advanced an ar-
gument rooted in the text of section 118.124 Robertson Stephens ar-
gued that "the plain language of the section evinces a congressional
intent to allow-indeed, to 'encourage "--compulsory arbitration
clauses. 125
Furthermore, Robertson Stephens argued that because the CRA
was enacted subsequent to the decision in Gilmer and the ADEA is
substantively similar to Title VII, the statutory language "authorized
by law" refers to Gilmer and its endorsement of civil rights statutory
claim arbitration. 126 Thus, according to Robertson Stephens's plain
text argument, the CRA was intended to encourage the use of com-
pulsory arbitration notwithstanding the express textual reference to
Gardner-Denver. 
127
Noting that the "plain text" argument had yet to be considered
by a appellate court and following the framework of the Mitsubishi
trilogy, the Ninth Circuit examined the purpose, text, and legislative
history of the CRA to determine the construction of the phrase
"[w]here appropriate and to the extent authorized by law."' 128 The
purpose of section 118, explained the Ninth Circuit, was to expand
122. See id.
123. See id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1998) (allowing for immediate ap-
peal of certified interlocutory decisions).
124. See Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1191.
125. Id.
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. Id. at 1193. The Ninth Circuit did note that several district courts have
reached differing conclusions regarding the plain text argument. See id. at
1191. Compare Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
995 F. Supp. 190 (D. Mass. 1998) (holding that the CRA precluded compul-
sory arbitration pursuant to the Form U-4) with Johnson v. Hubbard Broad.,
Inc., 940 F. Supp. 1447, 1456-58 (D. Minn. 1996) (holding that the CRA does
not prevent compulsory arbitration pursuant to the Form U-4).
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the substantive rights of employees and increase the remedies avail-
able for civil rights violations.
129
Moreover, the court noted that to accept Robertson Stephens's
argument would create "at least a mild paradox."'130 In the eyes of
the court, to conclude that Congress encouraged a system whereby
employees surrendered their judicial forum rights to the resolution of
future claims would be "at odds" with the primary purpose of
strengthening those available remedies.131 Indeed, such agreements
limit the amount of remedies available. 132 The panel concluded that
the purpose of the act did not sustain the plain text application advo-
cated by Robertson Stephens.1
33
The court then turned to the text of section 118 and noted that it
was "the critical statutory language."'134 Acknowledging that the
phrase, if read out of context, could be ambiguous, the court inter-
preted the language, in light of the CRA's "object and policy," to in-
stall substantive limitations on the use of compulsory arbitration.
135
The panel interpreted the phrase "where appropriate" to mean
"where arbitration furthers the purpose and objective of the Act-by
affording victims of discrimination an opportunity to present their
claims in an alternative forum... not by forcing an unwanted forum
upon them."'136 On this point, Robertson Stephens's interpretation
fell markedly short.
Similarly, the panel went on to consider the second qualifying
phrase "to the extent authorized by law." The court conceded that
because of the temporal conflict between the Act's passage and the
Gilmer decision, the endorsement of existing law under section 118
was ambiguous. 37 The court, however, interpreted the term "law" to
129. See Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1192.
130. Id. at 1192-93 (quoting Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 363
(7th Cir. 1997)).
131. See id. at 1193.
132. See, e.g., Thomas J. Stipanowich, Resolving Consumer Disputes, 53
DIsp. REsOL. J., Aug. 1998, at 8, 13 (discussing the limited remedies available
to the arbitrator in determining an award).
133. See Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1192-93.
134. See id. at 1193.
135. See id. (quoting John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust & Say.
Bank, 510 U.S. 86, 94-95 (1993)).
136. Id. at 1194.
137. See id.
April 1999]
LOYOLA OFLOSANGELESLAWREVIEW [Vol. 32:881
mean the law existing at the time the section was drafted-the rule of
Gardner-Denver-and not the law at the time the section was
passed-the rule of Gilmer as Robertson Stephens argued. 138 "The
overwhelming weight of the law at the time Congress drafted § 118
... was to the effect that compulsory agreements ... were unen-
forceable."'13 9 The court, however, did not rely solely on timing to
support its endorsement of Gardner-Denver.
To further support its conclusion, the panel relied on the legisla-
tive history of section 118 to bolster its construction. 4 ' The court
said that the legislative history "unambiguously confirms" that Con-
gress intended to adopt the rule of Gardner-Denver.14 1 The court
disregarded the implication that Gilmer could be the existing law un-
der section 118.142 It stated that while Gilmer turned out to under-
mine Gardner-Denver, this in no way altered Congress's intent.
143
The panel unequivocally declared the legislative history clearly im-
plied that section 118 intended "to codify its position that 'compul-
sory arbitration' of Title VII claims was not 'authorized by law,' and
that compelling employees to forego their rights to litigate future Ti-
tle VII claims as a condition of employment was not 'appropri-
ate."
144
Thus, the Ninth Circuit decided that Title VII claims are not
subject to compulsory arbitration. By examining the text, purpose,
and legislative history behind the CRA, the panel concluded that en-
forcing the arbitration clause would be inconsistent with congres-
sional intent.145  Furthermore, the panel sidestepped the Gilmer
precedent by noting that when the CRA was passed, an open ques-
tion existed as to which "law"--Gilmer or Gardner-Denver-section
118 endorsed. 146 Consequently, the logic went, the court was free to
adopt either precedent, nimbly distinguishing the two. Finally, the
court concluded that, under the framework of the Mitsubishi trilogy,
138. See id.
139. Id.
140. See id. at 1195.
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. See id. at 1196.
144. Id.
145. See id. at 1199.
146. Seeid. at 1189.
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the CRA manifested an intent to endorse the spirit of Gardner-
Denver in the context of employment agreements. 47 Consequently,
Tonja Duffield prevailed on her appeal for declaratory judgment and
the Ninth Circuit remanded her case for further proceedings.
148
IV. THE FLAWS
Despite grounding its opinion in an extensive analysis of legis-
lative history and weaving a careful path through precedent, the Duf-
field opinion makes several assumptions and missteps in its reason-
ing. The court fails to properly address Robertson Stephens's plain
text argument. Moreover, it does not fully discuss whether Duffield
waived her right to a judicial forum by operation of the Form U-4.
Finally, the court falls short of squaring its decision with the Gilmer
precedent in light of significant legal and factual similarities.
First, in one short paragraph and a footnote, the panel summarily
dismissed Robertson Stephens's argument that the legislative history
and text of the CRA support the arbitration agreement. 149 The text of
section 118 literally reads in favor of Robertson Stephens's posi-
tion-it openly encourages arbitration. 150 In addition, despite the
prevalent references to the Gardner-Denver opinion in the legislative
history, Robertson Stephens argued that the phrase "to the extent
authorized by law [embodies] an elastic phrase.., expanding and
contracting with the ebb and flow of court decisions."'' Indeed,
these decisions, including that of Gilmer, are the law.
152
While this argument is susceptible to a traditional slippery slope
attack, the panel failed to actually address the argument in its opin-
ion. Instead, Judge Reinhardt, writing for the panel, sarcastically
dismissed the contention, stating that to hold that section 118 was
"instantaneously transmogrified [to take] on exactly the opposite
meaning, [as Robertson Stephens suggested], . . . would entail a
147. See id. at 1195-96.
148. See id. at 1202-03. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's re-
jection of Duffield's claims that state tort and contract law raised a constitu-
tional bar to enforcing the Form U-4. See id.
149. See id. at 1197-98 &n.16.
150. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
151. Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1197-98.
152. See supra Part II.B.
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gross perversion of the legislative process."' 53 The casual dismissal
of Robertson Stephens's key argument revolving around the CRA
undermines the strength of the opinion. In short, the Ninth Circuit
fails to address-never mind distinguish-the Robertson Stephens's
plain text argument.
Second, the panel failed to adequately address the issue of Duf-
field's waiver of her statutory discrimination claims. The congres-
sional intent upon which the Ninth Circuit based its opinion clearly
evinces a desire to encourage arbitration where the parties knowingly
and voluntarily elect to use those methods. 154 Section 118 of the
CRA openly encourages arbitration where there is a voluntary
waiver. 55 Indeed, the Gardner-Denver case recognized this princi-
ple.156 This principle would seem to govern when an employee vol-
untarily agrees to submit to arbitration regardless of whether or not it
is a condition of employment. Although Gardner-Denver decided
that an agreement to arbitrate in a collective bargaining agreement
was not voluntary, the Gilmer court did not extend the precedent to
preclude arbitration in individual employment contracts. 5 7 Under
this theory, Robertson Stephens argued, the legislative history and
text of the CRA, in addition to Gardner-Denver, support "voluntary"
agreements to arbitrate Title VII claims and "Duffield's decision to
sign [the] Form U-4 was purely voluntary."'158 Clearly outside the
context of a collective bargaining agreement, Duffield's waiver
raises more than a mere barrier to the Ninth Circuit's conclusion be-
cause it resembles a Gilmer-like waiver-a waiver the Supreme
Court has found valid.
The court responded to this argument in a footnote by stating
"[w]hatever the merit of this dubious assertion, it is irrelevant here
because our task is not to divine a literal meaning of the word
153. Duffield, 144F.3dat 1198.
154. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 118, 105 Stat.
1071, 1081 (1991) (codified as a historical and statutory note to 42 U.S.C. §
1981 (1994)).
155. See supra notes 101, 107-09 and accompanying text.
156. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 52 & n.15 (1974).
157. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33-35
(1991).
158. Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1197 n.16.
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'voluntary'.."159 Again, the panel dismissed a valid textual argument
with flippant prose. At the very least, a waiver argument is signifi-
cantly more than a dubious assertion. The panel, however, failed to
adequately consider the argument. Indeed, Robertson Stephens's ar-
gument is rooted in Supreme Court precedent. The failure to address
the argument undermines the strength and scholarship of the opinion
and leaves a shaky foundation for subsequent case reliance.
Finally, despite couching its analysis in Mitsubishi terms, the
opinion fails to sufficiently square its outcome with the powerful
precedent of Gilmer. First, the ADEA discrimination claims in Gil-
mer were legislatively analogous to Title VII discrimination claims.
It follows that Duffield's civil rights claims would be subject to the
same analysis as Gilmer's ADEA claims. Second, the arbitration
agreement in the Form U-4 was factually identical to that in Duf-
field.160  Third, unlike Gardner-Denver, the arbitration clause in
Duffield was not implicated pursuant to a collective bargaining
agreement. These similarities factually equate Duffield's claims
with those of Gilmer and distinguish Gardner-Denver.
The panel, however, sidestepped Gilmer by merely endorsing
Congress's intent to codify the Gardner-Denver holding in the CRA
without equal consideration of Gilmer's factual and legal applicabil-
ity. 161 What the panel did not address was the possible inference that
Congress, by not overturning the Gilmer decision, intended to codify
its holding---or at least to exhibit a tacit acceptance of the Gilmer's
principles. Because of the factual similarities between Gilmer and
Duffield, the court should have thoroughly addressed and distin-
guished the precedent. 162 Instead, the court relied on the CRA's
159. Id.
160. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23; Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1185-86.
161. See Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1197 & n.14.
162. Since Duffield, other courts have recognized the similarities between
the ADEA and Title VII discrimination claims and have concluded that Gilmer
applies to mandatory arbitration pursuant to Form U-4. In Seus v. John Nuveen
& Co., 146 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 1998), the Third Circuit held the Form U-4 arbi-
tration clause was valid and enforceable under the FAA and that it applied to
an employee's Title VII and ADEA discrimination claims. See id. at 187. In
so holding, the Third Circuit expressly disagreed with the Duffield court. See
id. at 183; see also Mouton v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 147 F.3d 453, 455
(5th Cir. 1998)(enforcing arbitration clause with respect to Title VII claims);
Thomas v. Bear, Steams & Co., No. CIV.A. 3:93-CV-1970D, 1998 WL
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incorporation of Gardner-Denver as "law" and concluded the pre-
Gilmer legislative history is more dispositive than Supreme Court
precedent. Again, the Ninth Circuit failed to adequately address and
distinguish what is the largest challenge to its opinion.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Despite these flaws, the decision in Duffield is sustainable in
light of the legislative history of the CRA and its relevant case law.
Moreover, the court's decision is supported by strong public policy
to protect the rights of discrimination victims. Although the Ninth
Circuit failed to address the viability of the CRA's ratification of
Gilmer, a conclusive reading of the legislative history evinces a
strong intention to preclude compulsory arbitration. In addition, a
knowing and voluntary requirement for waiver of these statutory
rights, although authorized by the statute, runs counter to the pur-
poses underlying Title VII.
Despite the ambiguity of the term "law" in section 118, the
Ninth Circuit's conclusion that section 118 endorses Gardner-
Denver is sound in light of the policies underpinning the CRA. To
read section 118 as enforcing Gilmer would be thoroughly inconsis-
tent with the legislative intent that alternative dispute resolution
"supplement, not supplant" those remedies provided by Title VII. 63
The strongest support for the Duffield decision, however, is
rooted in the public policy underpinning civil rights statutes. Careful
consideration of the legislative history behind these statutes reveals
that Congress intended arbitration to aurnent the traditional judicial
remedies with the claimant's consent.'1 With the increase in em-
ployment litigation, the practical need for arbitration is rising. This
increase in arbitration should not come at the expense of the civil
rights and remedies provided under Title VII and similar laws. Ar-
bitration is simply an inadequate remedial forum for all civil rights
684232, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 25, 1998) (enforcing arbitration clause with re-
spect to Title VII claims); Sacks v. Richardson Greenshield See., Inc., 781 F.
Supp. 1475, 1487 (E.D. Cal. 1991) (enforcing arbitration clause with respect to
Title VII claims).
163. H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(11), at 97 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.S.C.A.N.
549, 635 (emphasis added); see supra notes 102-06 and accompanying text.
164. See, e.g., supra note 109 and accompanying text.
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litigation. 165 Moreover, the enforcement of compulsory arbitration
clauses limits if not erases many potential remedies available to a
discrimination victim. To protect these rights, the courts must safe-
guard against the erosion of the remedies.
In conclusion, the Duffield decision protects the availability of
the judicial forum to discrimination victims. To fashion a rule that
would require the victim to submit to a potentially inadequate forum
undercuts the purpose of providing the discrimination remedy. In es-
sence, mandatory arbitration declaws Title VII because victims can-
not avail themselves of its necessary protections. Thus, despite Duf-
field's patent flaws, this decision serves to safeguard the rights and
remedies guaranteed under Title VII and similar statutory schemes.
On November 9, 1998, the Supreme Court denied Robertson
Stephens's petition for certiorari.1 60 The denial of certiorari pre-
serves the holding of the Ninth Circuit's decision and enables Tonja
Duffield to proceed with her complaint against Robertson Stephens.
Despite this apparent victory guaranteeing a judicial forum for the
litigation of civil rights, the Supreme Court's refusal to enter the de-
bate creates even more doubt about the efficacy of mandatory arbi-
tration clauses in contracts. Until the Supreme Court promulgates a
uniform rule, the question remains as to whether we all have arbi-
trary civil rights.
Robert S. McArthur*
165. See Reginald Alleyne, Statutory Discrimination Claims: Rights
"Waived" and Lost in the Arbitration Forum, 13 HoFsTRA LAB. L.J. 381, 392
(1996).
166. 119 S. Ct. 445 (1998).
* I give my deepest thanks to my family and friends for their encourage-
ment, patience, and support. I also thank the editors and staff for their thor-
ough editing and useful advice. Finally, I dedicate this Comment to Liz,
whose profound love, inspiration, and laughter sustain me.
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